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Reorganizing Insolvent Corporations:
Evidence from Canada*
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Abstract
Taken together the international move from liquidation to reorganization-based
bankruptcy regimes and the international move to abolish Crown priority in
bankruptcy provide Canada with an opportunity to rethink Crown priority in
bankruptcy. This paper makes the case that abolishing Crown priority in
bankruptcy in Canada is optimal given a revaluation of traditional normative
claims surrounding Crown priority in the context of a bankruptcy system that
favours reorganization when possible. While this paper focuses on Canada, it
engages in a normative assessment that may be useful for possible reforms to
Crown priority in the United States and in other jurisdictions that, like Canada,
have been influenced, not only by the English model, but also by the American
bankruptcy and reorganization system.
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I. Introduction
[1]

As the recent Canadian movie ‘‘The Corporation’’ documents, the corporation has
[2]

to a large extent replaced the Crown and religion as the institution that
governs the lives of citizens worldwide. While historically Crown priority for
payment of debts was rooted in the theory that the ‘‘King could do no
[3]

wrong’’ this principle is being abandoned. However, in Canada the world of
bankruptcy has been largely unaffected by this change. This is the case despite
the fact that globally in the context of financially-troubled corporations, the
demise of the privileged position accorded to the Crown has paralleled
bankruptcy reform around the world that has been driven by institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund. Bankruptcy reform has seen an
international move from liquidation-based bankruptcy regimes to regimes
[4]

that encourage corporations to reorganize when possible. Increasingly,
governments are recognizing that formal reorganization provisions are
necessary to deal with the number and diversity of creditors of an insolvent
[5]

corporate debtor. There is also a growing realization that in most economies,
the value of a corporation comes from its human capital and goodwill, rather
than its assets. Accordingly, in many instances the value of liquidating
corporations has been reduced.
Crown priority originally arose as part of the royal perogative. At common law,
where there was a conflict between a Crown debt and another debt, the Crown’s

[6]

debt was to be given preference, so long as both were of equal degree. In
many instances in Canadian bankruptcy history, the royal prerogative has
been taken one step further by way of statutory provisions and judicial
interpretations that favour Crown debt, even when it is not of equal degree to
other competing debts. In reliance on the principle that because the royal
perogative arose by way of common law it can be limited by legislation,
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation governing Crown priorities has
displaced the royal perogative in Canada. In this context, there is a long and
detailed history of other creditors attempting to push the Crown to surrender its
privileged position in bankruptcy or reorganization.
[7]

Interestingly, while the royal perogative has English roots, having been
originally used by the Crown to assert a superior right to fish, wrecks, treasure
[8]

trove, swans and precious metals, England is the most recent jurisdiction to
have abolished Crown priority in bankruptcy, with a view to encouraging
corporations to reorganize when possible. This paper makes the case that
abolishing Crown priority in bankruptcy and reorganization in Canada is
optimal given a revaluation of traditional normative claims surrounding Crown
priority in the context of a bankruptcy system that favours reorganization when
possible.
In describing the events leading up to the most recent period of bankruptcy
reform in England, commentators have observed that there was a move away
[9]

from professional dominance and that discussions of reform resulted in ‘‘passionate

[10]

exchanges among a wide array of creditors, debtors and policy-makers.’’ In
making the case for the Canadian abolishment of Crown priority in bankruptcy,
this paper aspires to contribute to moving the content of the Canadian debate
in the field of bankruptcy and reorganization more generally, and Crown
priority more specifically, in this direction. While this paper focuses on Canada,
it engages in a normative assessment that may be useful for possible reforms to
Crown priority in the United States and in other jurisdictions that, like
Canada, have been influenced, not only by the English model, but also by the
American bankruptcy and reorganization system.
The international move from liquidation to reorganization-based regimes
provides Canada with an opportunity to rethink Crown priority by weighing
traditional normative claims along a new scale, where reorganization ranks high.
Part II of this paper describes and situates the Canadian corporate
reorganization system and Crown priority within the larger bankruptcy and
insolvency system in Canada. Part III sets out and assesses the normative
claims for granting the Crown priority in the context of a system that favours
reorganization over liquidation. This paper concludes by arguing based on this
normative assessment that Crown priority should be abolished in Canada and
a system that encourages the Crown to adopt a more ‘‘commercial’’ approach to
reorganization that commences prior to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings
should be implemented. This proposal is put forward as a preferable alternative to
the current Canadian reform proposals for continuing to limit director and
officer liability for unpaid tax and at the same time creating Crown liens

priority legislation to deal with Crown priority inside and outside of bankruptcy in
[11]

the same way.

II. Crown Priority in Bankruptcy and Reorganization in Canada
A. Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization system
The Canadian bankruptcy and reorganization system operates on the consensus
that when a corporation is liquidated, economic and social losses flow to all
stakeholders

including

shareholders,

creditors,

employees,

suppliers,

customers, the Crown and other involuntary creditors. Accordingly, a major
goal of Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization system is to encourage
reorganization where the social and economic value of a reorganized corporation
to all stakeholders, not just creditors, is more valuable than the liquidated
[12]

corporation. However, despite the national and international desire to
facilitate reorganization, the Canadian Crown still retains priority status,
ahead of secured lenders, for unremitted employee source deductions and for
amounts for which a third party garnishment order has been issued prior to the
commencement of a bankruptcy or reorganization of a corporate debtor.
The current Canadian framework provides that an insolvent corporate debtor
[13]

can either liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. If a
company has more than five million dollars in debt it can make use of either the
[14]

BIA to liquidate or reorganize or the Companies Creditors’ Arrangements Act to
reorganize. Canadian courts have interpreted the CCAA as having a broad

remedial purpose with a view to giving a debtor an opportunity to find a way out
of financial difficulties short of bankruptcy, foreclosure or the seizure of assets
[15]

through receivership proceedings. By way of refinancing through debt, equity or
the sale of business as a going concern, the BIA and the CCAA allow the debtor
to attempt to reorganize in a way that will enable it to meet the demands of its
creditors.
Following three decades of limited use, in the mid-eighties, in response to the
rigidity of the Canadian BIA and the requirement at the time that a debtor
company must be bankrupt to reorganize, the CCAA re-emerged as a significant
part of Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization framework. The Canadian
judiciary and insolvency practitioners have used the inherent powers granted
under the CCAA to the court to replicate many of the practices and powers
[16]

found in the American Chapter 11, however, without the same set of codified
[17]

procedures and practices found in Chapter 11.

In contrast to the more specific provisions found in the BIA, the CCAA is a short
statute, with few guidelines, that provides a flexible framework and the court with
a high degree of discretion. Because reorganizations under the BIA tend to be less
expensive but more rigid in nature, a reorganization under the BIA is better suited
for a small, less complicated proceeding. The CCAA, on the other hand, provides
more flexibility, a more comprehensive stay of proceedings, and accordingly is
better suited to complex, larger reorganizations, that cannot easily fit into the
more restrictive provisions found in the BIA.

Under both pieces of legislation, the debtor company continues to run its business
for the purpose of restructuring and a stay of creditors’ collection actions against
the reorganizing debtor is provided for. In the case of the BIA, a trustee, who is
usually an accountant, is chosen by the debtor and approved by the court to oversee
the process and at the same time provide guidance to the corporate debtor. In a
CCAA reorganization, a monitor, who is also often an accountant, and can be the
debtor’s former auditor, is appointed to fulfil a similar function. Both the trustee
and the monitor are court officers.
The trustee in a BIA and the monitor in a CCAA work with the corporate debtor
to file a proposal or plan of reorganization with the corporations’ creditors that
typically provides for paying off only a portion of the corporation’s debts and/or
paying the debts over a longer period of time. Both the trustee and monitor
must report to the court and the creditors on the financial affairs of the
company, the cause of financial difficulties and also provide creditors with a
comparison of how they would fare in a liquidation versus a proposal. The
trustee has a much more detailed set of statutory obligations and licensing
requirements than the monitor. The creditors and the court must approve the
proposal or plan of reorganization.
When a corporation attempts to reorganize, the Crown will typically be one of
its major creditors. In many cases, the Crown will have claims for employee source
deductions and goods and services tax (a value-added tax known as ‘‘GST’’). The
tension that persists between the rights of creditors, particularly secured creditors,
and the rights of the Crown when a corporation is insolvent are magnified when a

corporation is attempting to reorganize rather than liquidate. In order to
successfully reorganize, the corporation needs to be able to address the
repayment or rescheduling of these liabilities. At the same time, in order to
address these issues, the corporation needs to have ‘‘breathing space,’’ a respite
from collection activities of its creditors.
The battle over Crown priority in the Canadian bankruptcy context has been
fought in the context of expensive and lengthy litigation over technical
interpretations of the legislative provisions, without a clear articulation of the
competing policies at issue. Currently, a major review of Canada’s bankruptcy and
[18]

restructuring regime is under way. In November 2003, the Standing Senate
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce released its report after months
[19]

of consultation with various stakeholders. The Senate Report expressed the
view that the costs of restructuring should be minimized to the extent that it is
reasonably possible and so as to provide insolvent companies with the incentive
to reorganize rather than become bankrupt where it is in the best interests of the
[20]

stakeholders. Further, the Senate Report expressed the view that tax policy
and legislation should not move the debtor company to choose between
[21]

restructuring and liquidation. However, the Senate Report did not recommend
the abolishment of Crown priority in bankruptcy or reorganization.
In contrast to the United States, which has statutory priority schemes in its
bankruptcy legislation to deal with Crown claims for unpaid tax in a debtor’s

bankruptcy

[22]

or reorganization, or England, which historically relied on
[23]

preferred creditor status for unpaid taxes, Canada currently relies on the deemed
trust and the Crown’s garnishment powers as the two primary mechanisms for
granting the Crown priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Generally, amounts due
and owing to the Crown are unsecured claims in a bankruptcy or
reorganization. However, the deemed trust and garnishment powers operate to
givethe Crown an increased ability to collect its liabilities.
The priority status of creditors under a BIA liquidation can be divided into three
categories. First in priority are trust claimants, who are not creditors in the sense
that they have claim to property that the debtor holds in trust for them. Second in
priority are secured creditors who hold a valid lien, charge or security interest on
[24]

the property of the debtor. Third, are unsecured creditors that can be divided
into two categories, preferred creditors and ordinary unsecured creditors. Preferred
creditors are given priority over other unsecured creditors and include landlords
[25]

and employees up to a maximum amount. The remaining creditors are ordinary
unsecured creditors, including those with judgments, and share equally in what is
left of the distribution after all other claims have been satisfied.
Prior to 1992, Crown claims ranked above all other unsecured claims, as a
preferred creditor, even if the Crown claim was of equal degree. The 1992
amendments limited this priority and did away with the Crown’s status as a
[26]

preferred creditor. In an effort to circumvent this low ranking priority,
amendments were made to non-bankruptcy federal and provincial legislation

that created statutory liens for unpaid amounts owing to the Crown, a deemed
trust for amounts withheld by a debtor on behalf of the Crown but not
remitted, and provided the Crown with a power to garnish accounts receivable
[27]

owing to the debtor. Both technical and constitutional battles were fought on
each of these provisions. The Supreme Court of Canada held that attempts in
provincial legislation to circumvent the bankruptcy

legislation were

unconstitutional because the provincial legislation conflicted with

federal

[28]

legislation. Such provincial legislation is effective against other creditors
outside of bankruptcy proceedings, however, on the commencement of a
liquidation or reorganization, the bankruptcy legislation prevails.
Current law provides that in a bankruptcy or reorganization, the Crown’s claim
ranks as an unsecured claim unless the Crown has registered a security interest
under applicable provincial laws. Even if the Crown has registered such a security
interest, it is subordinate to competing security interests in the collateral that were
perfected before the Crown’s registration and the Crown’s security interest is valid
only in respect of amounts owing at the time of registration and any interest that
[29]

accrues subsequently. However, the deemed trust status of source deductions
pursuant to federal tax, pension and unemployment insurance and their
provincial equivalents for money withheld but not remitted to the government,
[30]

persists in bankruptcy and reorganization. Further, a garnishment letter
sent out prior to the commencement of bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings
[31]

retains a priority status.

B. Deemed trust
[32]

The deemed trust provisions found in the Canadian Income Tax Act are
recognized in liquidation and reorganization only for amounts withheld from
employees for federal and provincial equivalents for income taxes, unemployment
[33]

insurance and employee contributions to the Canada Pension Plan. On the
deemed trust theory, withholding taxes are granted priority over secured as well as
unsecured claims in liquidation, except for pre-existing liens on real property.
It has been estimated that approximately 87% of personal taxes in Canada are
collected by way of employers withholding remuneration paid to employees on
account of the employee’s tax for the year and remitting these amounts to the
[34]

government in prescribed intervals. The Crown estimates that employee
withholdings generate ‘‘most of the funds required for the federal
government’s own operations, but also the amounts redistributed through
[35]

various social programs.’’ The current status of the deemed trust for unremitted
[36]

source deductions can be traced to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision

in

[37]

Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp., the 1998 amendments to the ITA and
most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in First Vancouver Finance v.
[38]

Canada(MNR).

In Sparrow, both the Royal Bank of Canada and the Crown claimed an interest in
the proceeds of the bankrupt corporation. The Royal Bank had a security interest
in the inventory of the corporate debtor that was characterized as a fixed and specific

charge over the inventory. The Crown claimed a deemed trust with respect to the
debtor’s unremitted source deductions. The Court held that since the inventory was
subject to the Royal Bank’s security interest before the unremitted source deductions
gave rise to a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, the Royal Bank’s security interest
attached to the debtor’s inventory in priority to the Crown’s interest under the
deemed trust. However, in reaching this conclusion the Court noted that the
government was free to amend the ITA to strengthen the deemed trust provisions.
Accordingly, in 1998, retroactively to 1994, the ITA was amended to provide that
the deemed trust provisions are applicable from ‘‘the time the amount was
[39]

deducted or withheld,’ ‘‘notwithstanding any security interest in the amount so
[40]

deducted or withheld’’ and include ‘‘property held by any secured creditor . . . that
but for a security

[41]

interest would be property of the person.’’ Most recently,

in First Vancouver, the Supreme Court clarified that the deemed trust for
unremitted source deductions applies to after-acquired property, and while the
deemed trust does not continue to attach to property sold by the debtor the
proceeds of the sale are ‘captured by the trust.’
Deemed trust claims may be stayed under both the BIA and the CCAA. However,
while the stay is in effect, the debtor company must maintain the payments to
the Crown and if the debtor defaults in so doing, the stay order ceases to be in
[42]

effect.

Within six months of a CCAA plan or a BIA proposal being

sanctioned by the court, the deemed trust claims must be paid, unless the Crown

[43]

consents to an alternative payment schedule.
C. Garnishment powers

A statutory garnishment or an ‘‘enhanced requirement to pay’’ to recover GST or
income tax issued before the date of bankruptcy, the filing of a proposal or an
intention to file a proposal under the BIA or the initial order in a CCAA create a
property right for the Crown and the receivables to which the garnishment
[44]

letter attaches are no longer part of the bankrupt’s estate. This power has
given rise to a small amount of litigation, but has not presented the range of
technical or constitutional challenges that have arisen in relation to the
deemed trust. However, this power can in certain instances enable the Crown to
force a debtor into liquidation, prior to providing the debtor with an opportunity
to attempt to reorganize. The Crown can proceed in this manner without
providing the notice that a secured creditor, who holds similar powers, is
required to provide prior to enforcing its security. This issue is exacerbated to
the extent that Crown priority is eliminated in reorganization or bankruptcy and a
clear and consistent set of guidelines is not followed or articulated by the Crown
as to how it will use the garnishment power when reorganization of a debtor is a
[45]

possibility.

III. An Assessment of Normative Claims
Relating to Crown Priority
This section outlines and evaluates the recurrent normative claims that have been

made for and against Crown priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Each category of
claim is specifically considered in the context of the move from liquidation-based
bankruptcy regimes to regimes that encourage reorganization. Assessing
traditional normative claims surrounding Crown priority in the context of a
reorganization, rather than a liquidation, provides a good opportunity to
understand Crown priority within a whole system, with wider ranging
consequences than those impacting the distribution of the limited funds
available when a corporation is liquidated. That is, the context is broadened to
one that considers the implications of Crown priority on multiple converging
and diverging interests, where certain decisions with respect to values and
objectives have already been made with a move towards a reorganization
based rather than a liquidation-based corporate bankruptcy system.
As with reorganization rhetoric standing alone, none of the normative claims
alone suggest retaining or abolishing Crown priority in Canada, however, taken
together a powerful claim for abolishing Crown priority in Canada may be
made. The revaluation of traditional normative claims in this part of the paper
illustrate that if Crown priority is abolished the Crown will lose a source of direct
revenue, but this loss will be matched by private sector gains, which will indirectly
[46]

help the Crown.

That is, the net loss to the Crown resulting from the

abolishment of Crown priority is less than the value that will be created for a wide
range of stakeholders by allowing firms to reorganize. For firms that are
ultimately liquidated, the net loss to the Crown from the abolishment of Crown
priority is less than the value that will flow to unsecured creditors in not

incurring further claims that they will have limited ability to collect on.
A. Involuntary creditor
Creditors can be divided into those that voluntarily contract with the debtor and
involuntary creditors who are placed in a debtor/creditor relationship unwillingly.
The Crown, as an involuntary creditor, cannot screen potential debtors prior to
extending credit, and is compelled to take all debtors, regardless of the level of
[47]

[48]

their credit. Another type of involuntary creditor is the tort claimant.

Within

the category of contractual creditors, certain creditors because of an inequality of
bargaining power with the debtor may look more like involuntary creditors than
[49]

voluntary creditors. Such creditors include unpaid suppliers of the debtor. Unlike
other creditors, involuntary creditors and weaker voluntary creditors may not
have the ability to diversify their credit and/or negotiate for terms that take into
[50]

account their debtor/creditor relationship.

Depending on the amount of power or influence it is believed that the Crown
currently holds in Canadian society, one might think that the Crown is a rather
unlikely member of this group of relatively powerless creditors. At the same time,
[51]

the Crown does share the attribute of being an involuntary creditor. The
Canadian response in the liquidation context historically was to insert certain
safeguards in the bankruptcy system for involuntary creditors and voluntary weak
creditors. However, recently this response has been met with hostility from the
insolvency practitioner community with claims stemming primarily from the

[52]

impact of such priority on the possibility for reorganizing.

Accordingly, the Crown’s claim to priority status as an involuntary creditor may
be refuted on the basis of recent bankruptcy and reorganization reform efforts
in Canada that have rejected granting involuntary and voluntary weak
creditors a special priority on the basis of the involuntary nature of their claims
where the successful reorganization of corporations is at stake. For example, as
between small suppliers and the Crown, small suppliers are harder hit by
default of the debtor and are less able to prepare for the risk, yet Canada has
moved in the direction of eliminating any priority status for such suppliers.
Further, unlike other involuntary creditors, the Crown is in a position to adjust tax
[53]

levels to account for the possibility of default. In addition, unlike other
involuntary and voluntary weak creditors,

but similar to an investor

contemplating an investment portfolio, the Crown has a completely diversified
portfolio of debtors, which many consider to be a rational

method of

[54]

maximizing the value of one’s investments. This advantage may be sufficient
to compensate for the Crown’s inability to adjust individual risk premiums
[55]

when the risk of default of one of its debtor’s increases.

B. Other collection options and the integrity of the taxation system
A key reason for the Crown’s uneasy fit in a group of involuntary or voluntary
weak creditors is the fact that that the Crown is supported by a strong legislative
taxation scheme and has an arsenal of other collection devices, not shared by all

other creditors, available to it prior to the insolvency of the debtor corporation.
These include the imposition of penalties, high interest rates and third party
liability. Further, it is open to the Crown to improve its status by registering a
security interest against the corporate debtor. An argument can also be made
that the Crown may impose certain additional requirements on corporate
debtors, such as requiring that source deductions or unremitted GST be kept
in a separate trust account or that a security bond be posted.
In a system that grants Crown priority for unpaid taxes in bankruptcy,
delinquent collection efforts may be rewarded. This is the case despite the
fact that requirements, such as those imposed on directors, ensure that the Crown
has regular reports on the corporation’s tax payments, which may be more
information than is provided to many of the corporation’s other creditors.
Further, in many instances other unsecured and involuntary creditors will have
no way of knowing if the corporation has been delinquent in its collection efforts.
These are the same creditors who will carry the largest part of the burden if the
Crown is granted priority in liquidation.
The Crown’s most convincing response to the claim that it has a whole host of
other collection options available to it and that the current process rewards its
shirking of responsibility, is that what is ultimately at stake in assessing the
Crown’s claim for priority in bankruptcy is the integrity of the taxation system. The
rhetoric that supports Crown priority as a method of ensuring integrity of Canada’s
taxation system reflects the American position and was adopted by the Supreme
Court of

Canada in Pigott Project Management Ltd. v. Land-Rock Resources

[56]

Ltd, holding that ‘‘no other system is so crucial to the overall collections
procedure adopted by the Crown . . . understandably, that conversion cannot be
[57]

countenanced if the integrity of that system is not preserved.’’

It has been suggested that the American position on Crown priority can be
distinguished from the British pattern on the basis of a persistent rhetoric
surrounding the integrity of the taxation system. That is, because taxation in
modern society relies on the integrity of the taxation system, if Crown
priority was limited or removed in the bankruptcy context, tax compliance
[58]

would cease to exist. A similar normative claim has been made in the Canadian
context, however, it is not supported by the actual functioning of Canada’s
taxation system as it relates to financially troubled corporations. This is
demonstrated by an examination of the Crown’s policy on Crown priorities.
The Canadian Crown is of the view that ‘‘since the Crown’s priority results
from legislation that is binding on third parties, the CCRA [Crown] is not obliged
to monitor the person’s business, to issue forms or claims, or to register or
[59]

publish notice of its priority rights’’ Further, ‘‘a creditor who is trying to decide
whether to seize and sell a person’s property in which the creditor has a secured
interest, or thinking about appointing a receiver to recover the debt, cannot get
any information about any amounts that the person may owe under a deemed
trust unless the person gives the CCRA written authorization to disclose such
information. However, once the creditor begins official proceedings to recover
the secured amount, the CCRA can communicate the details of any deemed

trust claim that it may have.’’

[60]

This policy clearly does not comport with the

Crown’s claim that what is at stake in maintaining Crown priority is the integrity
of Canada’s taxation system.
When the goal of reorganization is inserted in the discussion surrounding the
integrity of the taxation system, a persuasive argument may be made that a
taxation system that does not exhibit all signs of integrity assists a financiallytroubled corporation in reorganizing by providing the corporation with time and
money in the form of unpaid taxes. However, when the entire reorganization
process is viewed as a whole this may not be the case. The higher the Crown’s
priority in a reorganization, the less likely that other stakeholders, such as
unsecured creditors and certain secured creditors, will take an interest in the
process, thereby negatively

impacting the possibility of a successful

[61]

reorganization.

The normative claim in favour of maintaining the integrity of the tax system
favours abolishing Crown priority when viewed in the context of the interests and
roles played by all stakeholders in reorganization. However, the Crown’s current
collection policies suggest the need for reform efforts to ensure that the goals of
preserving the integrity of the taxation system while also encouraging
reorganization are met in the pre-bankruptcy or reorganization context.
C. Protection of the public purse (or the general public)
Related to the rhetoric in favour of maintaining the integrity of the taxation system,
the rhetoric in favour of allowing corporations to reorganize rather than liquidate

is often centred on the public interest in retaining jobs, stability and community
among other goals. However, in the context of Crown priority this claim is
challenged by the view that it may be that the benefits to the smaller number of
corporate stakeholders in allowing the corporation to reorganize are diminished
by the impact of unpaid Crown debts on the public more generally. To that extent,
the policy arguments centre on notions of property ownership and unjust
enrichment. That is, the tax arrears are amounts that never belonged to the
debtor and should not be used to reorganize the debtor or provide a windfall to
the corporate debtor’s other creditors.
Standing against this claim is the fact that corporate debtors cannot readjust
the amount of credit owing to the Crown and transfer the risk of non-payment to
the Crown because it is a ‘‘cheaper’’ creditor. The amount of tax owing is a legal
requirement that cannot be adjusted beyond a maximum amount at the debtor’s
[62]

discretion. At the same time, in most instances, if the corporation is not able to
reorganize, the public purse will be harmed by the very limited recovery on
[63]

Crown debts. There is also the danger that if the Crown is granted too much
priority with a view to protecting the public purse, Canada’s bankruptcy and
restructuring regime will not be the collective governance mechanism that it was
[64]

intended to be, but rather a tax collection device. Further, the loss to the public
purse may be proportionally minimal compared to the loss to other creditors and
to the extent that other creditors are able to continue as taxpayers after the debtor
corporation’s reorganization, the Crown can continue to collect tax from them.

It may be that in order to achieve the objective of reorganizing insolvent
corporations, the losses should be born by the general public, not just those who
[65]

were in a debtor/creditor relationship with the debtor.

Even within the Crown, more than simply tax authorities are implicated in the
[66]

insolvency of a corporation. A successful reorganization, may not only limit the
extent of loss to the Crown for unpaid corporate taxes, but also the losses to other
federal, provincial, and local governments with diverse economic interests in a
corporation’s reorganization.

Ultimately, the quality of

neighbourhoods,

communities, the environment and retirement may be at stake in decisions as to
[67]

whether to protect the public purse by abolishing or granting Crown priority.

Interestingly, the Senate has recently endorsed a view that would interfere with
the public purse at the urging of the insolvency practitioner community on the
basis of technical amendments to Crown priority. Currently, insolvent corporate
debtors can convert debt into distressed preferred shares, which are accorded special
treatment under the ITA, but that are costly to create. The benefit of such preferred
shares is that they provide a low cost means of financing a restructuring at the
expense of the public purse. The Senate recommended amendments to the ITA that
would dispense with the current procedures and provide that distress preferred
share treatment for tax purposes be afforded to qualifying debt, for a specified
[68]

period of time, by filing a notice of election. Further, Senate dealt with the current
difference in tax treatment as between a debtor that reorganizes and a debtor

[69]

that sells the business as a going concern. The Senate recommended that as is
the case in a liquidation and purchase, a debtor should be able to elect to use
fresh start accounting for tax purposes in a reorganization, with tax obligations
relating to the period prior to the date of bankruptcy addressed as pre-filing
[70]

claims. There does not appear to be a principled reason for a ‘‘back-door’’
approach to encroaching on the public purse, where the rhetoric that the Crown
asserts in favour of retaining Crown priority rests on an interest in preserving the
public purse.
D. Bankruptcy as a collective process
Similar to the policy in favour of including secured creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding, if the Crown is able to ‘‘pull the plug’’ in the same way that a secured
creditor is able to realize on the oven of a reorganizing pizza parlour, a
[71]

reorganization will be thwarted. As discussed in Part II, unlike secured
creditors who are required to provide notice to the debtor prior to enforcing
on their security, the Crown is not required to provide the debtor with notice
prior to issuing a garnishment order. Accordingly, if Crown priority is abolished,
garnishment orders may be issued with increased speed and frequency and a
debtor may not have as long of a period to extend its operations in insolvency by
making use of funds owing to the Crown.
It does not automatically flow from the implications of Crown collection
mechanisms on the collective bankruptcy process that the Crown should continue
to hold a priority status. Following the English approach, this claim supports the

establishment of a better working relationship between the Crown, other
creditors and debtors with the goal of full contribution to a system that favours
reorganization. Such an approach necessitates an understanding that not all
corporations should be reorganized.
Upuntil September 2003, the Crown in England had been criticized for insisting
on 100% payment in order to approve proposals under the corporate voluntary
[72]

arrangement (‘‘CVA’’) and for taking significant periods of time to approve
proposals. These problems were in part due to the lack of integration among
departments and staffing problems, thereby frustrating proposals that
[73]

unsecured creditors would otherwise agree to. It was recommended in the
course of the 1999 consultations held by the Insolvency Service that the Crown
develop a more commercial approach to CVAs so that proposals that were
less than 100% would be accepted if it was held that the CVA would offer a
[74]

superior return in the long run.

On the basis of these views, the taxing authorities in England established a
Voluntary Arrangements Service, which had the mandate of working ‘‘to help its
customers, to work collaboratively with the private sector and other government
departments and to make a full contribution to business rescue by supporting viable
businesses

through

periods

of

temporary

[75]

difficulty.’’

The

Voluntary

Arrangements Service published criteria for assessing the acceptability of
[76]

proposals.

Even without the development of a Canadian equivalent to the British Voluntary

Arrangements Service, the abolishment of Crown priority will provide the Crown
with the incentive to support reorganizations given its low priority should the
corporation ultimately liquidate. Further, to the extent that the current system
provides debtors with a longer period of time to recover, as the Crown is less
likely to the monitor its payment of taxes, the abolishment of Crown priority
would place a corresponding incentive on secured creditors to monitor, albeit with
less information. Ultimately, even if the result in such a system is that the Crown
or secured creditors in certain instances will attempt to liquidate debtors more
quickly, there may be a corresponding benefit to other stakeholders, such as
unsecured suppliers, when the debtor is not be able to increase an unsecured
debt that it will not be able to pay.
Canada has not adopted a blanket policy in favour of reorganization, but rather a
policy in favour of reorganization when it is in the best interests of all stakeholders,
including the Crown. Professor Sarra adopts this perspective in asserting, ‘‘when
the firm is economically inefficient and change in governance practice will
not remedy it’s financial distress, the best outcome may be to liquidate and
release the capital to higher value uses.’’

[77]

E. Effect on availability of credit
Secured lenders and the lawyers that represent them have repeatedly suggested that
they will cease to lend funds to corporations or will do so only at a higher rate of
interest unless the extent of the Crown’s priority is clarified. For example, as one
prominent Canadian lawyer, asserts: ‘‘Rather than increase its monitoring to ensure

that source deductions are paid on a timely basis, Revenue Canada has shifted the
burden of its monitoring to secured lenders, who may or may not have the ability
to monitor the borrower’s compliance with its duties to remit source deductions.
This approach places additional risk on lenders, and will undoubtedly be factored
into lenders’ advance rates, and lenders’ costs of doing business in Canada.’’
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The claim made by lenders is that despite expensive and lengthy litigation that
has focused on the technical bounds of the provisions relating to Crown priority in
a bankruptcy or reorganization, there is still a significant lack of clarity, and the
goal of enhancing commercial accessibility to credit by minimizing uncertainty in
[79]

the resolution of policy disputes has not been realized. Rather, a ‘‘seize
mentality’’ persists, as does a ‘‘technical war’’ among creditors. On this basis,
lenders need to closely monitor debtors, which in turn pushes up the cost of
credit and results in higher interest rates. This impact has been born more by
corporations that are labour intensive, versus capital intensive, and have a
significant number of employees and accordingly are subject to the deemed trust for
unpaid source deductions.
Working against this claim is the lack of empirical data retained by the Crown on
exactly how much they collect by way of the existing mechanisms in a bankruptcy
[80]

or reorganization

and the lack of data supporting the fact that with each court

challenge credit becomes less and less accessible. Further, market conditions also
dictate the supply of credit and may mitigate against higher lending costs associated
with Crown priority status.

Given the pervasive nature of a security interest taken by an operating lender,
and the fact that in most cases if Crown priority is abolished the benefit would
[81]

flow to secured creditors, a more powerful claim may be made in favour of
abolishing Crown priority on account of the corporate debtor’s creditors on the
basis that the Crown is also a creditor of these creditors. Accordingly, the secured
creditors’ gain out of the abolishment of Crown priority and the possibility of a
reorganized entity may offset the Crown’s losses in the form of increased taxes.
This claim is most evident in a consideration of the difference between
operating lenders who are secured by inventory and accounts receivable of the
debtor and are better able to protect against the risk of Crown priority in their
lending practices, and term lenders who are secured by fixed assets and are not in
a position to protect against such risk. Roderick Wood and Rick Reeson provide
an excellent illustration of the problem with the existing law that grants the
Crown priority over term lenders: ‘‘A seller (SP) sells a piece of heavy equipment
to a construction company under a secured instalment purchase agreement.
There is $100,000 left unpaid on the purchase price and credit charges. The
construction company later experiences financial difficulties and fails to remit
source deductions. It also fails to make any further instalment payments to
[82]
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SP.’’ Pursuant to the ITA, the Crown has priority over SP to the heavy equipment
despite the fact that SP has not benefited from the construction company’s failure to
remit source deductions.

F. Creditor’s bargain
[84]

In The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law,

Thomas Jackson makes the case

that based on the creditor’s bargain, entitlements in bankruptcy should not
differ from those outside of bankruptcy. A system that does not follow this premise
will provide an incentive for creditors to push a debtor into bankruptcy in order
to obtain the advantages available in bankruptcy and not outside of bankruptcy.
Accordingly, a claim may be made that Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization
system should not provide for separate Crown priority, but should instead
maintain the priority status held by creditors of a solvent corporation. This is
the position that was adopted in the German Bankruptcy Code of 1994
[85]

(Insolvenzordnung), which was implemented in 1999.
A proposal resembling Jackson’s model was put forward in evidence given to the
[86]

Senate this past year. The proposal provided for the creation of a new statutory
regime that provides a uniform system for governing Crown priority both inside and
[87]

outside of a bankruptcy or reorganization. The uniform system would provide for a
requirement that the Crown registers a security interest in order to retain a priority
status in a bankruptcy or reorganization, with an exception to the first-in-time rule
for security interests on amounts currently covered by federal deemed trusts.
Among other critiques that this proposal, like Jackson’s model, may be subject
to, is that it is based on the premise that an insolvent corporation consists of
nothing more than a pool of assets, without a residual potential. This is

contrary to both the Canadian and the international move to bankruptcy systems
that value ongoing business relationships and recognize the hardships that fall
not just on creditors, but also on other stakeholders when a corporation is
liquidated. In order to achieve this objective, where there is an entitlement
outside of bankruptcy, in many instances it will be necessary to revalue this
entitlement in bankruptcy or reorganization with a new priority scheme that
reflects a society’s valuation of reorganized entities over liquidated entities.
Where the Crown retains the same priority status inside and outside of
liquidation, it will have little interest in continuing with a reorganization. To the
extent that the Crown has no priority status in a bankruptcy its concern with
receiving a share of the entity may contribute to the Crown’s desire to assist in the
reorganization of the debtor and to prevent the piecemeal sale of the
corporation’s assets. Further, a review of Canadian legislative history in this area
suggests that the adoption of Crown liens priority legislation would give rise to
another wave of technical amendments and litigation, and would not contribute
to the goal of reorganization of insolvent corporations when possible.
G. Director and officer liability
Intimately connected with normative claims pertaining to Crown priority are the
normative claims relating to director and officer liability for unpaid taxes. At
the same time as abolishing Crown priority in Canada, it may be necessary to
reconsider a move towards limiting director and officer liability for unpaid
taxes. Such an approach is consistent with the overall Canadian and

international move towards holding corporate gatekeepers more accountable in
[88]

light of recent corporate scandals. However, this approach was not adopted in
the Senate’s recommendations on Crown priority or director and officer
liability.
Currently when a corporate debtor becomes insolvent or is in the vicinity of
insolvency, the corporation’s directors are exposed to personal liability for unpaid
debts including Crown debts. However, based on the fact that insurance for director
and officer liability that covers liability to the Crown is increasingly difficult
and costly to obtain during the reorganization period, and the desire to
recruit and retain good directors and officers, amendments were made to
the BIA and the CCAA in 1997. In both a CCAA reorganization and BIA
proposal, the ability of the Crown to collect unpaid taxes from directors and
officers is weakened by the range of defences available to directors under tax
legislation and the possibility of

compromising claims as part of the

reorganization. The 1997 amendments now make it possible for a CCAA plan or
a BIA proposal to provide for the compromise of claims against directors where
they are legally liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such
[89]

claims. Further, to facilitate such a compromise, the stay may extend to them
[90]

with respect to these claims.
]

Most recently, the Senate Report, with a view to increasing the number of

competent directors willing to continue with insolvent corporations,
recommended augmenting the compromise mechanism in the BIA by

providing for a generally applicable due diligence defence against personal
[91]

liability for unpaid taxes for corporate directors. Interestingly, the Senate Report
did not make a similar recommendation for the CCAA. In order to satisfy the
due diligence defence that is available under most existing tax legislation,
directors must demonstrate active involvement in ensuring compliance. This
may include evidence that controls were established to account for withholdings
of employees and remittances, requiring financial officers of the corporation to
report regularly on the implementation of these controls, and obtaining
regular confirmation that withholdings and remittances have in fact been made
[92]

during all relevant periods. It is unclear whether an amendment to the BIA to
provide for a generally applicable due diligence defence would require the same
evidence as is required under existing tax legislation.
Justifications in favour of imposing personal liability to third parties on directors
and officers of corporations are premised on their roles as gatekeepers and
monitors as well as the desire not to externalize the costs of operating a
corporation. These arguments are said to be strongest in the context of
[93]

involuntary creditors, such as the Crown. Further, the justifications for limiting
personal liability with the goal of providing directors and officers with the
opportunity and incentive to engage in justifiably risky behaviour on behalf of
the corporation is limited in the taxation

[94]

context.

As a corporation

approaches insolvency, this risky behaviour may include putting off
payment of taxes. The Crown has made the claim that if Crown priority is

abolished this will lead them to issue garnishment notices at a higher speed and
in larger numbers, with the ultimate result of forcing corporations into bankruptcy
[95]

at an earlier stage. However, if Crown priority is abolished and a mechanism is
put into place to ensure the cooperation of the Crown prior to bankruptcy, the need
for an incentive to entice directors and officers to engage in such risky
behaviour in order to achieve the goal of reorganization of a corporation will not
exist. Accordingly, the need to further limit director and officer liability beyond
the existing defences found in tax legislation may not be necessary if Crown priority
is abolished.

IV. Conclusion
Internationally and in Canada, multiple and competing approaches to corporate
insolvency have been converging around the goal of preserving viable corporate
enterprises. While Canada is a beneficiary in part of British insolvency laws, over
time there have been adjustments and diversions from the British approach,
influenced by both local conditions and international developments. The
history of Crown priority in Canada’s bankruptcy system is one of undue
complication that has taken away from the goal of an effective reorganization
process. The evaluation of the normative claims in Part III builds a convincing
case for reverting to our British roots by following their lead and dispensing
with Crown priority. However, in order to effectively implement this process, it
will be necessary for the Crown to commit to a ‘‘commercial approach’’ to
reorganization even before a corporation has entered formal bankruptcy

proceedings. A model for this approach is the English Voluntary Arrangements
Service that was implemented prior to the abolishment of Crown priority in that
[96]

country.

To summarize, the proposals put forward in this paper call for the abolishment of
Crown priority, the adoption of a commercial and cooperative approach to
collection of debts by the Crown and a reconsideration of the move to limit
director and officer liability for unpaid taxes. These proposals are consistent
with the growing international recognition that insolvency systems do not serve
simply to raise the efficiency level of local and international economies.
Rather, such systems are necessary to affect a balance among social,
[97]

economic and political interests.

These factors favour not only formal

reorganization mechanisms, but also the abolishment of Crown priority in
bankruptcy.
This paper has not provided a systematic explanation of why given a normative
assessment that favours abolishment of Crown priority in bankruptcy Crown
priority persists in Canada. Professional dominance of groups involved in reform
efforts who have fees at stake in future work emanating out of technical
amendments to

Crown priority and the prevailing ideology of a small,

homogenous group of lawyers and accountants who represent creditors and
debtor corporations in Canada are likely part of the answer to this important
question. The quest for the answer to this question should be part of the ongoing
research agenda on issues of bankruptcy and reorganization reform in Canada.
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Our Aim
We want to contribute to the development of the rescue culture by supporting viable businesses
experiencing temporary ﬁnancial difﬁculties. This support will be directed at providing the
optimum return on existing debt so that loss to the Crown is kept to a minimum, and encouraging
proposes to meet their future statutory obligations on time. We believe that supporting businesses
that identiﬁed and eliminated the causes of past difﬁculties will stimulate enterprise and
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When Will We Seek To Modify AVoluntary Arrangement?
Ideally we should not need to modify the substance of a voluntary arrangement proposal very often
because we expect the optimum offer to be put forward to creditors after due provision for
necessary business expenses including all statutory liabilities as they fall due and (where
applicable) reasonable private and domestic expenses we will discuss how we consider that the offer
can be improved and then look to the purpose to change the proposal voluntarily. If the proposal
is not improved voluntarily we will propose modiﬁcations to the substance of the offer. We may insist
that all of these are approved before we agree to support the proposal. We may also need to make
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deﬁne terms or clarify the role of the supervisor. We will discuss these with the insolvency
practitioner who is acting.
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